Stated preference surveys are usually carried out in one session, without any follow-up interview after respondents have had the opportunity to experience the public goods or policies they were asked to value. Consequently, a stated preference survey needs to be designed so as to provide respondents with all the relevant information, and to help them process this information so they can form accurate preferences during the survey. In this paper, we study experimentally an elicitation procedure in which respondents are provided with a sequence of dierent types of information (social cues and objective information) that allows them to sequentially revise their willingness-to-pay (WTP) values. Our experiment was carried out in large groups using an electronic voting system which allows us to construct social cues in real time. To analyse the data, we developed an anchoring-type structural model that allows us to estimate the direct eect (at the current round) and the indirect eect (on subsequent rounds) of information. Our results shed new light on the interacted eect of social cues and objective information: social cues have a mixed direct eect on elicited WTP values but they have a strong indirect eect on how respondents process scientic information. We suggest that the construction and the provision of social cues should be added to the list of tools and controls for stated preference methods.
Introduction
It is common knowledge that respondents in stated preference surveys often form their preferences during the interview (Carlsson, 2010) . 1 In these surveys, respondents have to form value judgments on public goods or policies they are often not familiar with and on which they are very likely not to have clear preferences. This does not apply only to non-market goods: there are many private market goods on which consumers can be uncertain regarding their preferences. When choosing these experience goods, for instance movies, cars, wines, consumers have been shown to use non-price extrinsic cues such as expert opinions or others' preferences to make their decision (see, e.g., Aqueveque 2006 Aqueveque , 2008 Salazar and Oerlemans, 2016) . However, the main dierence from stated preference surveys is that consumers in markets can process information and learn their preferences over several consumption events. This is usually not the case in stated preference surveys. Surveys are carried out in one session, without any follow-up interview after respondents have had the opportunity to experience the public goods or policies they were asked to value.
Consequently, a stated preference survey needs to be designed so as to provide respondents with all the relevant information, and to help them process this information so they can form accurate preferences. Our paper pursues this line of thought, exploring an elicitation procedure where respondents are provided with a sequence of dierent types of information. This procedure allows them to sequentially revise their willingness-to-pay (WTP) values.
1 The literature has long been divided on the fact that respondents in stated preference surveys are forming their preference during the valuation exercise. (Some) economists have been reluctant to accept this line of argument, which is supported more by psychologists (see, e.g., Fischo, 2005) . Economists' reluctance to go too far down the psychology route, and their sticking to the ex-ante preference perspective, is understandable: without stable preferences, any assessment of social welfare is dicult, if not impossible, to make. This is problematic, since valuing public goods using surveys is the primary objective of stated preference methods (Mitchell et Carson, 1989) . Recent developments in behavioral economics and interest in policy analysis, however, open new perspectives (Thunström and Shogren, 2016; Chetty, 2015; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2013; Robinson and Hammitt, 2011) .
Information provision has been studied extensively in the literature (see, e.g., Rowe et al. 1980; Bergstrom et al. 1990; Ajzen et al. 1996; Hanley and Munro, 1999; Spash 2002; Maruyama et al., 2004; Chanel et al., 2011) . Often the underlying idea is that some information may be relevant for benets assessment usually referred to as objective information whereas other types of information may lead to biased responses, for instance through a form of anchoring.
Respondents may take their cues from the behavior of others in their social networks (real and virtual), which inuences their value formation for the goods featured in contingent valuation (CV) studies (Polomé, 2003; List et al., 2006) . Respondents simply set their WTP values according to others' WTP, i.e. conform to a social norm, because they have diculty processing the value of the proposed good or policy. Lohse et al. (2017) test this idea in a within-sessions design with real payments and show that mean payments in previous sessions have a signicant impact on WTP values for CO2 reduction. 2 Taking insights from these two strands of the literature, we hypothesize that combining the two types of information, social cues and objective information, will help respondents learn and form accurate preferences.
To test this, we carry out a CV experiment on long-term exposure to air pollution with large respondent groups. 60 to 100 people are surveyed simultaneously in the same room using an electronic voting system. Our elicitation procedure is as follows. First, we ask the respondents their WTP for the good based solely on their prior knowledge/information. We then construct social cues in real time in a controlled experimental setting by computing WTP statistics from the group's elicited WTP values and immediately showing them to all the respondents. The respondents are subsequently given the opportunity to revise their WTP. Next, we provide objective information (in our case, scientic information about the good) and allow respondents to further revise their WTP. We again assess the eect on the group's elicited WTP values and construct social cues by showing the result to the respondents, who can revise their WTP if they wish to do so (Chanel et al., 2006 . 3 Our aim in this research was not to uncover the eect of information (whether it could be social cues or objective information) but rather on how to design a WTP elicitation procedure that would help respondents constructing their preferences towards an unfamiliar good. We were more interested in the combined eect of dierent types of information than the marginal eect of the dierent types of information taken separately (which In addition, we complement our baseline treatment described above by two additional betweenrespondents treatments. The rst consists of adding a cheap talk script to the baseline treatment.
Cheap talk, rst proposed by Cummings and Taylor (1999) , is a method of reducing hypothetical bias. Respondents are warned prior to the elicitation question about the dangers inherent in building their counterfactuals concerning what they would pay for the good with respect to what they would pay if it were provided for real. Dozens of published CV studies have tested whether the cheap talk approach really mitigates the hypothetical bias, with mixed results (Little and Berrens, 2004; Murphy et al., 2005; Stefani et al., 2017) . Our cheap talk treatment uses a neutral script that not only points out that hypothetical surveys tend to elicit higher than real-life WTP, but also warns respondents that protest responses can produce zero values. This added script is the only dierence from the baseline experiment, thereby allowing us to study the interaction of cheap talk with information provision.
Our second additional between-respondent treatment is based on a behavioral approach borrowed from social psychology. Otherwise identical to the baseline treatment, it adds a commitment device in the form of signing a petition about environmental preservation (Ami et al., 2014) . Social psychology has extensively studied how people can be induced to commit to target behavior by being asked to perform preliminary, usually costless, actions (Kiesler, 1971 ). Commitment appears to be stronger when obtained through a free decision, publicly made and signed (Joulé and Beauvois, 1998 ; see also Jacquemet et al., 2011 ; for a discussion of commitment in stated preference surveys). In our petition treatment, we commit people to environmental preservation by asking them to sign a real petition (sent to the then candidates in the French presidential election) prior to participating in the CV experiment. They are free to sign or not, and do so in front of other people.
The aim of this prior political behavior is to put people in a citizen framework, acting from the perspective of a person who is not purely self-interested. We then study how these experimentally generated citizens respond to scientic information and social cues.
We analyze our data using descriptive statistics and by means of more structural econometric anchoring-type models. We nd that social cues have only a marginal direct eect on WTP values but a large indirect eect on how respondents in our experiment process objective scientic has been already explored). Consequently, we did not consider sessions in which each type of information was considered separately.
information. We show that only respondents whose WTP falls below the mean WTP used as the rst social cue respond to scientic information, even though they were initially non-sensitive to this social cue. Our take-home message is that social cues should be incorporated in the tools and controls of stated preference methods.
Experimental design
The impact of dierent types of information on WTP is studied in three experimental treatments (baseline, cheap talk, and petition) and three dierent scenarios (move, drug and regulation):
this is a 3 × 3 design, and each of the 9 sessions uses the same sequential elicitation procedure throughout. Figure 1 presents a summary of the experimental design.
Subjects were recruited in October 2006 in Marseille (2nd largest French city) through advertisements in local newspapers and on local TV news and randomly assigned to one of the nine sessions. an electronic voting system that allowed some of the information to be collected in real time from up to 120 respondents, thus ensuring that experiments were carried out in the same manner in each session. We present, in the following, the scenarios, the elicitation procedure and the three treatments. 4 See appendix G for summary statistics on respondents' characteristics. Equality tests show that randomization was successful for almost all socio-demographics considered.
5 Our experiment was an ocial collaboration between academics from the local University, the National Center for Scientic Research (CNRS) and the Regional council. The room we used was the room where elected members of the Council take decisions for the Region. One can hypothesize that respondents in our experiment thought that their opinion matters, which would indicate that their WTP values are consequential (Vossler et al, 2012) . 
Hypothetical scenarios
The good being valued in our experiment is a decrease in air-pollution-related eects. Obviously there is more than one way to elicit trade-o between a change in income and a change in air pollution exposure. As a form of robustness check, three typical scenarios were selected from the CV literature on air pollution, to ensure that our ndings would not be scenario-specic.
Participants were assigned to one session only and each session was devoted to one scenario only.
Each participant was thus presented with only one scenario. The rst scenario concerns a new drug (see Appendix A) that prevents adverse health eects of air pollution exposure for the respondent alone (Alberini et al., 2004; Krupnick et al., 2002) . The second scenario involves moving the whole household (see Appendix B) to an already less polluted city (Viscusi et al., 1988; Guria et al., 2005; Aprahamian et al., 2007) . The third scenario is about new regulations (see Appendix C) on air pollution that will potentially increase market prices (Desaigues et al., 2007) .
These scenarios involve dierent degrees of environmental conservation. The drug scenario does not refer to any particular measure to protect the environment, whereas the two other scenarios do. The move scenario implies that local action has already been taken, with the result that one of the locations has less air pollution. The regulation scenario presupposes national, or even international, measures to protect the environment. The scenarios also dier in the societal perspective adopted. The drug scenario refers to subjects' private sphere in a market-like situation, where only the subject benets from the drug. The move scenario also refers to the private sphere of the respondents but concerns the entire household. Finally, the regulation scenario, which comes closer to current air pollution policies, concerns society as the whole. Overall, respondents in the drug scenario are asked to adopt a personal or consumer perspective, whereas in the regulation scenario they are asked to adopt a societal perspective, and the move scenario lies between the other two.
Sequential elicitation procedure
The CV experiment began with a self-administered survey on the respondent's socio-economic background and knowledge of air pollution. Once the self-administered survey was lled in, the elicitation procedure started. Each step of the procedure was simultaneously performed by all the respondents, using individual screens. The rst round started with a list of closed-ended questions with ascending bid amounts; respondents used the electronic system to vote until they • Round 1: no scientic information, no social cues,
• Round 2: information on social cues from Round 1 (SC 1 ),
• Round 3: scientic information (SI ) and information on social cues from Round 1,
• Round 4: information on social cues from Round 3 (SC 2 S), scientic information and information on social cues from Round 1.
Instructions were given to respondent one round at a time and respondents were not aware of the number of rounds to avoid end-game eects (on end-game eects, see, e.g., Andreoni, 1988) .
Communication between respondents -which might lead to private social cues from neighbors in the same session -was prevented in the following ways. Members of the research team were always present in the voting room. Sucient space between seats, both between rows and within rows, made it impossible to read other respondents' open-ended WTP responses. For the ascending bid voting, each respondent had an individual voting system that did not display the vote outcome.
The three experimental treatments
Baseline treatment. We conducted 3 sessions in the baseline treatment. In each session, one of the three scenarios was randomly selected without replacement at the beginning of the experiment (each session thus had a dierent scenario) and presented to respondents, then WTPs regarding air pollution were elicited using the sequential procedure described above. The total number of subjects in the baseline treatment is 198.
Cheap Talk treatment. There were three sessions, identical to the baseline except for a neutral and light cheap talk script (see Appendix D for the script) that was read aloud and presented the respondents both on the main screen of the voting room and on the individual screens just after the scenario was presented. The script is neutral in that it provides no quantitative information on the direction and the size of the hypothetical bias; it simply tells subjects that, in a hypothetical situation, respondents tend to over-or under-state their WTP as well as giving protest answers (see Ami et al., 2011 ; for more details). The aim of this treatment was to make respondents more aware of how others behave in similar hypothetical situations. All other aspects of the experiment were as in the baseline treatment. As in the baseline, each session in the cheap talk treatment was associated with a dierent hypothetical scenario. In total, 174 subjects participated to the cheap talk treatment.
Petition treatment. The sessions in the petition treatment are identical to the baseline except for a petition oered to each respondent before the valuation exercise. Three students from the Department of Psychology, who presented themselves as apolitical students, asked the subjects to sign the petition before entering the voting room. The students memorized and used the same script each time they presented the petition (see Appendix E for a full translation). All respondents in these sessions were exposed to the petition, which they were free to sign or not (82.3% did).
Herein, we adopt an intention to treat strategy: all respondents assigned to the petition treatment are included in the statistical analysis. This ensures that there is no selection bias in the data.
The petition treatment therefore tests the eect of being exposed to political behavior on elicited WTP values (see Ami et al., 2014 ; for more details). All other aspects of the experiment were as in the baseline treatment. We carried out three sessions, each with a dierent hypothetical scenario.
In total, 243 subjects participated to the petition treatment.
3 Unconditional analyses 3.1 Sensitivity of WTP to information provision 
The normalization allows the distance to be expressed as percentages for comparison across treatments. In Table 2 , we compute the mean of d Results are intuitive, although on a small group of participants: displaying the mean WTP is more likely to inuence participants with substantially higher WTP, who then revise downwards, and participants with substantially lower WTP, who then revise upwards. Participants who do not revise have WTPs closer to the mean WTP displayed in round 2. This result holds whatever the treatment considered. This relationship between the distance of WTP values to the mean WTP of the room and the decision to revise downwards or upwards also holds for social cue 2. In Table   2 , we observe that the respondents who revise upwards after the second social cue are more likely to be below the mean in round 3 and those who revise downwards above it. Finally, we examine the impact of the participants' self-assessed prior knowledge of air pollution on the propensity to revise in rounds 2 and/or 4 (after social cues are provided) and in round 3 (i.e. after scientic information is provided). We nd prior knowledge to have more impact on participants' revision after social cues (p=.094) but less impact on revision after scientic information delivery (p = .0397). This can be interpreted as showing that better informed participants are less likely to revise when additional information is of a scientic nature, but slightly more likely when information is based on others' beliefs (through displayed mean WTP in rounds 2 and/or 4).
3.2 Magnitude of the eect of information provision on WTP Scientic information leads to an increase in mean WTP, signicant in the cheap talk and petition treatments (p < .001) but not in the baseline treatment (p = .137). These treatments seem to encourage respondents to take the valuation exercise seriously, making them more sensitive to the scientic information. Third, the eect of treatments on WTP values depends on the scenario implemented, as shown at the bottom of Table 3 where the data are broken down by scenario. In the drug scenario, the sole signicant change found across rounds is an increase following scientic information provision in the cheap talk treatment (p < .001). In the move scenario, the scientic information eect is found both with cheap talk (p = .012) and with the petition (p = .0001); when combined with the petition, social cues also lead to a signicant increase in round 2 (p = .072). In the regulation scenario, scientic information has a signicant and positive eect in all treatments (p = 0.006 for baseline, p = 0.079 for cheap talk and p = 0.021 for petition); when combined with the petition, social cues also have a signicant eect in rounds 2 (p = 0.023) and 4 (p = 0.024). 
Econometric analysis
So far, however, we have considered only dierences in mean WTP and have not accounted for potential composition eects across sessions. We therefore need to conrm the above ndings on the eects of cheap talk, the commitment device, social cues and scientic information provision in a more systematic way, taking into account respondents' heterogeneity. We do so by considering the following econometric model that consists of four equations:
where α i is a respondent-specic eect that accounts for heterogeneity of preferences and i an idiosyncratic error term. In this model, participants combine their prior WTP, WTP1, with the social cues and scientic information at each round of the procedure. The parameters γ 1 , γ 2 and δ stand for the inuence of social cue 1, social cue 2 and scientic information respectively.
The model is reminiscent of the anchoring / starting point bias models in the stated preference literature on double-bounded elicitation mechanisms. In these models, the respondent combines his / her prior WTP value with the rst bid value irrelevant to the value of the good but used as a cognitive anchor to respond to the second bid (see, e.g., Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Aprahamian et al., 2007) . The main dierence in our setting is that information provision may play a role in forming preferences. Like anchoring and starting point bias models, the model that consists of equations (eq.2)-(eq.5) can be rewritten using a simple panel data regression (see, e.g., Whitehead, 2002 ; for an application to the anchoring/shift model) such that:
where r 2 , r 3 , r 4 are dummy variables specic to each round of the elicitation procedure that take the value 1 and zero otherwise. Since, as seen in section 3.1, respondents whose WTP is below the mean tend to revise upwards whereas respondents above the mean revise downwards, the model calls for some exibility. Otherwise, it might spuriously be concluded that social cues and/or scientic information have no impact on WTP because the two eects cancel out on average.
Thus, we dierentiate between the two eects by considering that parameters γ 1 , γ 2 and δ depend on which side of the mean WTP a respondent's elicited WTP falls. This means considering six parameters instead of three: (γ 1a , γ 1b , γ 2a , γ 2b , δ a , δ b ), where subscript b stands for WTP values below the mean and subscript a stands for WTP above the mean. For the social cues, we consider the mean WTP computed from the previous round, which were displayed to respondents. For scientic information provision, we consider the mean WTP displayed in round 1, since mean WTP from round 2 was not displayed.
In practice, we estimate three models, one for each treatment: baseline, cheap talk and petition.
In anchoring models, the fact that subsequent WTP values are combinations of previous WTP values and the bid proposed during the elicitation procedure can introduce heteroscedasticity (see Aprahamian et al., 2008) . This is problematic, insofar as anchoring models are based on dichotomous dependent variables and heteroscedasticity potentially induces inconsistency of model parameters (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985) in addition to ineciency. In our case, we observe
continuous WTP values and the estimated parameters are unbiased and consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity, although the estimated variance-covariance matrix is not correct. It is therefore important to use a robust estimate of the variance-covariance matrix that controls for heteroscedasticity to make correct statistical inference.
In Table 4 , we present the estimated parameters together with their associated p-values for the three treatments. For the sake of simplicity, we consider WTP values in logarithms to avoid censoring issues. As our focus is on the causes of WTP revision within a respondent, we estimate xed eects models that control for all time-invariant dierences between individuals (including scenario eects or knowledge). 8 Our results are two-fold. First, social cues have a mixed eect on elicited WTP. In the baseline treatment, we observe no direct eect on WTP values from displaying mean WTP, neither with social cue 1 nor social cue 2. In the cheap talk treatment, only respondents with WTP below the mean prior WTP elicited in round 1 and above the mean WTP elicited in round 3 respond to social cues. Respondents with WTP below the mean in round 2 and respondents above the mean in round 4 both revise their WTP value upwards in the cheap talk treatment. In the petition treatment, the mean WTP has the same eect as in the cheap talk treatment: respondents with WTP below the mean revise upwards. However, the mean WTP displayed in round 4 now induces respondents below the mean, and not above it, to revise their WTP upwards. As seen in section 3.2, the cheap talk and petition treatments seem to make respondents more sensitive to the scientic information, encouraging them to take the valuation exercise seriously. Moreover, we nd that scientic information has a strong signicant inuence, but only on participants whose WTP is below the mean WTP displayed in round 2 of the procedure. The results hold for all three treatments.
7 This is also why it is important to consider the impact of information on the scale parameter in discrete choice experiment (DCE) models (see Czajkowski et al., 2015 Czajkowski et al., , 2016 ; for a detailed analysis of this issue).
8 We tested whether a xed or random eects model was appropriate, using Hausman tests. For each scenario, Hausman tests strongly reject the null of no correlation between the unobserved individual eect and the covariates matrix (p < .001 in all three scenarios). This means that parameter estimates in the xed eects model are consistent, whereas parameter estimates in the random eects model are not consistent. 
0.1265 0.000 0.2099 0.000 0.1457 0.000 5 Discussion and concluding remarks Stated preference surveys involve creating markets for non-market goods that are often unfamiliar to respondents or for which scientic information is lacking or controversial. With non-market goods, however, unlike experience goods in markets, survey respondents do not learn their preferences through consumption events but rather during the survey itself. Consequently, information provision is a key aspect of stated preference survey design. Stated preference research has essentially focused on providing objective information about the good, the payment mechanism, the cost, etc. Only a few authors have explored how the opinions of others can inuence elicited WTP values and, to our knowledge, no authors have addressed the combined eect of both types of information in a comprehensive way. In our CV experiment, we apply an original within-subjects procedure that introduces both objective information and social cues gradually in a large-group experimental setting. We are therefore able to assess how respondents react to dierent types of information and how such information may interact with other survey devices: cheap talk and commitment obtained in the guise of signing a petition.
Our descriptive statistics results are two-fold. First, we nd that social cues have little direct eect on WTP values. Only a small proportion of respondents revise their WTP values after information about the mean WTP of the whole group is displayed. This is true for both social cues and for all treatments considered. When respondents revise after a social cue, those whose WTP is below the mean tend to revise upwards, while those above the mean tend to revise downwards. More detailed statistics on the joint distribution of the revisions at the dierent steps of the procedure indicate that most of the respondents who revise after social cue 1 only revise at this step of the procedure. At the aggregate level, the magnitude of the WTP revision induced by social cues does not lead to a signicant change: mean and variation of the WTP distribution remain unaected. Second, in our setting, scientic information has a signicant positive eect on elicited WTP values. More than one third of the participants respond to scientic information, with 30% of them revising upwards. Those who revise upwards tend to have lower WTP values than the mean WTP. Moreover, revision in response to scientic information is likely to be the only WTP revision. The eect of scientic information is strong, and this holds whatever the treatment considered.
These descriptive results lead us to conduct a structural econometric analysis of our procedure.
We incorporate the inuence of social cues and scientic information in an anchoring-like model that considers that respondents combine their WTP elicited in the previous step of the procedure with the new information. Moreover, we introduce dierent inuence parameters depending on which side of the mean respondents' WTP falls, below or above. We show that the model is parsimonious enough to be estimated by a simple xed eects panel data regression allowing us to control both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Structural results conrm that social cues have a mixed direct eect on WTP values, while scientic information has a clear direct positive eect on WTP values. What emerges clearly from the data is that the eect of both social clues and scientic information on WTP values depends strongly on which side of the mean respondents' WTP falls. Social cues have no direct eects on WTP values in the baseline, but only respondents whose WTP is below the mean displayed in round 1 revise upwards as a result of scientic information. 9 In the cheap talk treatment, participants with WTP below the mean revise upwards after the mean WTP is displayed in round 2, while it is those with WTP above the mean who revise upwards in round 4 (although the parameter is not very signicant). Again, only respondents below the mean tend to revise their WTP value after receiving scientic information.
In the petition treatment, the eect of social cues and scientic information is also dependent on 9 Note that using the displayed mean WTP in round 1 or the undisplayed mean in round 2 is numerically equivalent, as there is no signicant dierence in mean WTP between these two rounds.
whether respondents' WTP falls on one or the other side of the mean WTP. Scientic information induces a revision upwards for those below the mean and both social cues induce a revision upwards for those below the mean (as in the cheap talk treatment, the parameter associated with the revision after SC2 is not very signicant). One interpretation of the mixed eect of social cues is that in both the cheap talk and the petition treatments, and unlike the baseline, others are explicitly involved in the survey design whether directly in the cheap talk script (previous studies have
shown that participants in stated preferences surveys...) or indirectly in the petition treatment through social norms (i.e. environmental preservation). This may well trigger the direct eect of social cues on WTP values: the cheap talk or the petition intended here as a commitment device are, at least partly, social cues as well. Sherif, 1936; and Asch, 1951) . In particular, informational social inuence can be particularly strong when a situation is ambiguous or uncertain (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004) . This is often the case with unfamiliar goods, even when researchers attempt to dene clear hypothetical valuation tasks (through scenario design, elicitation techniques, cheap talk scripts, etc. This new drug is reimbursed neither by the social security system nor by the CMU (state meanstested health cover) nor by the complementary health insurance policies. This implies that, if you choose to buy it, you will bear the full cost. We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay to use this drug, which would reduce by half the long-term diseases and mortality risks associated with air pollution. Do not forget that this money will be drawn from your household's budget! You will therefore have less money at the end of the month for consumption or savings.
B Appendix Move scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the best decision for yourself and your household. Let's imagine that you and your household have to move. You can choose between two cities which are exactly equivalent in terms of inhabitants, working conditions, schools, climate, public services, cultural life, transport, housing, surroundings, etc. There is only one dierence between them: the level of atmospheric pollution. The rst city -let's call it POL -is as polluted as Marseilles. And the second city -let's call it LESSPOL -is half as polluted as
Marseilles.
The problem is that the cost of living is higher in LESSPOL (the less polluted city): housing, local taxes, public transport, etc. are more expensive. This means that if you choose to move to LESSPOL, you will have to pay more to have the same standard of living as in POL. We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay per month for you and your household to move to LESSPOL (the less polluted city) rather than to POL (the town as polluted as Marseilles). Do not forget that this money will be drawn from your household's budget! You will therefore have less money at the end of the month for consumption and savings.
C Appendix Regulation scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the best decision for yourself and your household.
Let's imagine that new laws and rules are to be adopted to limit air pollution. Therefore industries, manufacturers of consumer products, public or private transport, will have to adopt less polluting technologies. Studies have shown that these new laws and rules will make it possible to reduce by half the number of highly polluted days in the PACA region, and particularly in Marseilles.
The implementation of these new technologies will induce higher costs in every-day life: energy, food and other goods, transport. This means that you will have to pay more to enjoy the same standard of living as before the implementation of these new laws and rules.
We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay per month for these new laws and rules to be implemented. Do not forget that this money will be drawn from your household's budget! You will therefore have less money at the end of the month for consumption and savings.
D Appendix Cheap Talk script
Similar studies show that the amount respondents are willing to pay can dier from what they would pay in real life.
For instance, some respondents state a lower willingness to pay in relation to what they would otherwise pay, or even refuse to pay anything. This could be explained by the fact that they want to express a point of view such as I have the right to breathe good quality air or I shouldn't have to pay for good quality air; it's polluting rms or the state who should pay.
On the other hand, people may state a higher amount than they would pay in real life, that is, if they really had to pay out of their pockets. We would like you to try not to behave like these people, but to answer as sincerely as possible. If you want to make any comments concerning the amount of money you state which you didn't have the opportunity to verbalize during the procedure, don't hesitate to write them down at the end of the questionnaire, where a space is devoted to your 29 comments.
E Appendix Petition script
Soon, all the candidates for the next presidential election will be known. You may know that for several days, since a few days, a petition has been circulating in France. The aim of this petition is to obtain a commitment from each candidate, whatever his/her political background, to include the questions of environmental conservation in his/ er program, because it is important that each of us is able to make informed choices.
We need a lot of signatures. Therefore, if you think, like us, that issues of environmental conservation are essential issues on which candidates for the presidential election should take a clear stance, we invite you to sign this petition. Thank you.
F Appendix Scientic information
Actually, few people realize the impact of air pollution. There are three dierent types of eects:
irritant eects (that lead to additional illnesses), fatal eects (that lead to additional premature deaths) and eects on the living environment. Exposure to high levels of air pollution over several years leads to a deterioration in health status. Researchers and doctors have noticed for about 30 years that when air pollution levels peak, and in locations where air pollution levels are high, more illness and more deaths are observed. When we study the links between air pollution and health, one issue is to determine whether the visit to a doctor or the hospital stay of a given individual is caused by air pollution. Complex studies have therefore been done worldwide on large samples of individuals, and researchers have been able to compute the number of cases that, on average, were due to air-pollution exposure. The additional illnesses due to irritant eects cause health problems: irritated eyes (red, watering and smarting eyes), headaches, sore throats, coughing ts, u symptoms (with fever and tiredness), asthma attacks and even hospitalizations for pneumonia, acute asthma or respiratory and heart conditions.
Move scenario: The people who live in PEUPOL face a less polluted environment and therefore have less health problems. It can be computed that, during the next 20 years, 100 people living in G Appendix G: Sample characteristics *P-values for mean equality tests between the sample exposed to a specic treatment and the remaining sample **Two-sample test for unpaired samples and unequal variances Bold characters when p-value < .05
